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ABSTRACT 
Paper ini ingin melihat siapa yang berada di balik pergerekan harga selama periode 
pengumuman merjer dan akuisisi di Bursa Efek Jakarta. Data menunjukkan bahwa harga 
meningkat cukup tajam selama periode pengumuman. Penelitian ingin membandingkan 
apakah investor asing atau domestik yang mendorong pergerakan harga tersebut. 
Disamping itu, penelitian ini ingin melihat apakah pergerekan harga terkonsentrasi pada 
volume perdagangan (trade size) yang kecil atau tidak dan apakah terkonsentrasi pada 
investor domestik yang menggunakan volume perdagangan yang kecil. Hasil analisis 
memperlihatkan bukti yang cukup kuat yang menunjukkan bahwa investor domestik 
mendorong pergerakan harga tersebut. Untuk hipotesis kedua dan ketiga, tidak ditemukan 
bukti yang cukup kuat. Pergerakan harga oleh investor domestik tersebut menunjukkan 
superioritas informasi yang dimiliki oleh investor domestik, yang berarti ada asimetri 
informasi di Bursa Efek Jakarta. 
Keywords: Price movement, trading size, acquisition announcement.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper attempts to answer three 
questions: (1) who are behind price 
movements in Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX): 
domestic or foreign investors, (2) which trade 
size accounts for the largest price movements 
in the JSX, and (3) whether an interaction 
between type of investors and trade size affects 
price movements in the JSX. The answers to 
each question have many theoretical and policy 
implications. From theoretical implications, for 
example, the asymmetric information between 
foreign and domestic investors lends support to 
asymmetric point of view as a possible 
explanation to home-bias phenomenon (for 
example, see Kang and Stulz, 1997; Grinblatt 
and Keloharju, 2000). From policy 
implications, the findings in this paper 
highlight several issues, for example: (1) the 
findings may contribute to design of market 
surveillance for insider trading activities, (2) 
an information asymmetry is one kind of 
barriers for foreign investors, thus removing 
this barrier to increase investor base is of a 
concern for financial authority. 
To summarize the paper, this paper finds 
that domestic investors move prices more 
during the announcement periods. Based on 
several tests, this result seems to suggest that 
domestic investors possess better information 
than do foreign investors. This conclusion 
supports asymmetric information in the 
Indonesian market. Although domestic 
investors become much more active during the 
event periods, the observation of trading 
volume and number of transactions during the 
event periods shows that both foreign and 
domestic investors become more active than in 
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the non-event periods. This finding seems to 
suggest that the degree of asymmetric 
information does not seem to be as serious as 
we thought. Both classes of investors 
participate in ‘non-public yet’ information. 
Evidence to answer the second and third 
questions seems to be weak. Although the 
signs are generally as expected – smaller trades 
and small trades of domestic investors move 
prices more – , but smaller sample precludes 
me from obtaining strong statistical power. 
This paper is organized as follows. We 
review related literature in the next section. 
Section 3 discusses data and methodology used 
in this paper. The result and discussion follow 
in section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Information is an important key in financial 
markets. Those who possess information are 
likely to gain. Efficient market hypothesis put 
information as a central theme. According to 
the hypothesis, an efficient market is a market 
in which prices reflect all information. One of 
the implications of such hypothesis is that an 
investor will not be able to gain excess return 
only if s/he uses information that has not been 
impounded in the prices. 
This study investigates whether certain 
class of investor possess better information 
than other class(es) in an emerging market. 
This study relates to several issues. First, this 
study relates to the effect of segmentation on 
information endowment. Previous papers show 
that segmentation, either exogenous or 
endogenous, leads to a violation of the law of 
one price (for example, see Stulz and 
Wasserfallen, 1996; Bailey and Jagtiani, 1994; 
Domowitz and Madhavan, 1997). We 
investigate the effect of investors’ location (i.e. 
domestic and foreign investors) on information 
endowment. There are several papers that 
discuss this issue. Literature on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) generally assumes that 
foreign investors are in a disadvantageous 
position compared to domestic investors (for 
example, see Shapiro, 1994). But other factors, 
such as intangible factors, lead to direct foreign 
investments in other countries. Second, finance 
literature documents the home-bias 
phenomenon (French and Poterba, 1991; 
Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; and Tesar and 
Werner, 1995). Empirical findings show that 
despite a significant decline of the barriers to 
international investment, foreign ownership is 
much more limited. Domestic investors tend to 
hold domestic stocks disproportionately larger 
than implied by mean-variance model and the 
declining barrier of international investment. 
While the barriers still exist and may have an 
impact on this phenomenon (Stulz, 1981), one 
possible explanation to the phenomenon is an 
information asymmetry in the international 
markets. Investors seem to exhibit preference 
for stocks they are familiar with (Merton, 
1987).  
The literature above generally argues, 
either implicitly or explicitly, that in domestic 
markets, foreign investors are in a 
disadvantageous position compared with 
domestic investors. Several empirical findings 
seem to support such prediction, see for 
example Hau (2001), Bhattacharya et al. 
(2000). The message in Battacharya et al. 
(2000) is very similar to the message in this 
paper. Specifically, they focus on the Mexican 
market: en emerging market where insider 
trading practices seem to be prevalent. They 
conclude that insiders seem to take advantage 
of their information. The Indonesian market 
seems to posses a much similarity with the 
Mexican market.
1
 While there is an abundance 
of insider trading suspicions, there has been no 
criminal indictment of such practice.
2
  
However, the conclusion that domestic 
investors have better information is still 
controversial, see for example, Grinblatt and 
                                                          
1 See Johnson et al. (2000) for a recent paper investigating 
corporate governance of emerging markets in the Asian 
financial crisis.  
2 Criminal indictment can be argued as the most serious 
measure to fight insider trading activities. 
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Keloharju, 2000, for the Finland case and 
Bonser-Neal et al. (1999) for the Indonesian 
case. There is also a common perception on the 
street that foreign investors in developing 
markets are more sophisticated than domestic 
investors, hence possess information 
superiority compared to domestic investors. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Data 
We use transaction data obtained directly 
from the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX). The 
data set contains date of transaction, date of 
settlement, stock identification, price, trading 
volume, trading value, time, broker id, broker 
origin (foreign or domestic), board type, and 
investor identification (foreign, domestic, and 
broker account). The acquisition news 
announcements are based on Rachmawati and 
Tandelilin (2001). The announcements used 
end before July 1997, which is a start of the 
period of financial crisis in Indonesia. 
Rachmawati and Tandelilin (2001) eliminate 
the announcements after July 1997, arguing 
that the acquisitions during the crisis period 
may not be based on synergy reason, rather 
more on structuring reasons. This paper also 
adopts the same argument. Moreover, since 
foreign investors activities significantly 
diminish during the crisis period, the use of 
pre-crisis period avoids possible bias for 
domestic investors. We also remove acqui-
sition news before May 1995, since the data set 
starts from the automation of the JSX, which is 
in May 1995. 
The data set identifies the identity of 
investor’s location (domestic, foreign, and 
brokers).
3
 But the data have limitations, for 
example, the data do not have the details of the 
investors’ country of origin, nor does a 
breakdown into individual and institutional 
                                                          
3 The Jakarta Stock Exchange is basically an order driven 
market without active market makers. But the 
transaction data codes transactions by brokers. The 
brokers seem to make up any imbalances in the market. 
In general, the role of the brokers is not significant. 
investors. This paper uses coding from the data 
set to identify investors’ location. We focus on 
transactions that take place in the regular 
board. The regular board is the most liquid one 
(about 83% [89%] of the JSX’s trading value 
[volume] during our sample period) and is 
likely to be the place for typical investors to 
trade. 
We are able to collect 18 acquisition news 
announcements as the sample. The sample is 
clearly small, but it has an advantage of being 
homogenous, since it is all about acquisitions. 
Another possible approach is to use various 
types of news. The advantage is that we can 
collect more news announcements, but at the 
expense of heterogeneous news which is more 
difficult to interpret.  
2. Methodology 
We calculate return generated by each type 
of investors. Since we focus on private 
information, we focus on price movements 
during day -14 to -1 before news 
announcements. We delete trading generated 
by brokers since we focus on foreign and 
domestic investors. We cumulate returns for 
each type of investors. Then we calculate 
percentage (proportion) of cumulative returns 
such as follows: 
Pct i,j = (Cum Return i,j / Total Cum Return i)  
Subscript i and j refer to news announcements 
and types of investors. We further use 
regression analysis to test more formally the 
proposition that domestic investors account for 
larger price movement during the news 
announcements. Specifically, we use Pct i,j as 
dependent variable and a dummy with value of 
1 for domestic and 0 for foreign investors. The 
variable Pct i,j creates heteroskedastic 
regressions; this problem leads to inefficient 
estimation. We weigh Pct i, j by absolute value 
of Total Cum Return i (Barclay and Warner, 
1993). Under this specification, extreme values 
receive little weight in the regression analysis. 
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This procedure reduces the heteroskedastic 
problem. 
PRICE MOVEMENT BETWEEN 
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTORS 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show cumulative 
abnormal return, daily trading volume, and 
daily number of transactions by investor types 
from day -30 to +30 relative to the event date. 
Figure 1 shows that prices start to move before 
the event. Interestingly, after the event prices 
still drifts upward, suggesting slow reaction of 
the market to the acquisition news announ-
cements
4
. This upward movement toward the 
announcement is consistent with Barclay and 
Warner (1993). The result also shows that the 
Indonesian market seems to be ‘efficient’, in 
the sense that it responds to the news (see for 
example, Battacharya, 2000, for different 
pattern in the case of emerging markets). The 
market becomes much more active during the 
event periods, as shown by large daily trading 
volume and number of transactions. Both 
domestic and foreign investors become more 
active during the event periods than in the non-
event periods, although domestic investors 
seem to show higher increases than do foreign 
investors. 
Descriptive statistics of cumulative returns 
during the event periods (day -14 to day -1) 
shows that domestic investors account for a 
much larger price movements than foreign 
investors; domestic investors account for about 
186% versus 0.2% for foreign investors, or 
about 100% of total price movement if we 
convert into proportion. While the difference 
between domestic and foreign investors seems 
to be obvious, statistical tests do not show any 
significance at conventional level. The small 
sample seems to drive such insignificance. 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative Abnormnal Return during Announcement Periods
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4 In the Indonesian case, the under-reaction issue has been relatively underexplored. 
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Figure 2 Daily Trading Volume by Type of Investors
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Figure 3 Daily Number of Transaction by Type of Investors
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2. Regression Results 
Regression analysis used to investigate 
more formally the difference between domestic 
and foreign investors. More specifically, the 
tests can be used to discriminate private and 
public information hypothesis. The private 
information hypothesis (by domestic investors 
in this context) predicts a positive and 
significant coefficient for type of investors, 
while public information hypothesis predicts 
positive and significant coefficients for 
proportion of trading volume (Barclay and 
Warner, 1993).
5
 Table 1 shows the results of 
the analysis. 
 
Table 1. The effect of type of investors, trading volume, and number of transactions on cumulative 
returns during the announcement periods 
This table summarized regression of cumulative returns during the period of news announcement 
on several variables. Type of investor has a value of 1 for domestic and 0 for foreign investors. 
The definitions of other variables are explained in the text. ***, **, and * mean significant at 1%, 
5%, and 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Intercept 
 
 
Type of Investor 
 
 
Proportion of 
  Trading Volume 
   
Proportion of 
   Number of 
   Transaction 
 
Proxy for Proportion of 
   Trading Volume 
 
Proportion of 
   Number of 
   Transaction 
 
Adj-R-Sqr 
 
Num of Obs
5
 
 
-30.35 
(-1.66) 
 
159.27 
(6.24)*** 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
0.61 
 
34 
 
-85.68 
(-5.33)** 
 
-80.73 
(-1.73)* 
 
3.48 
(5.76)*** 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
0.81 
 
34 
 
-84.19 
(-4.71)*** 
 
-130.32 
(-2.07)* 
 
- 
 
 
3.95 
(4.84)*** 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
0.77 
 
34 
 
16.27 
(1.07) 
 
74.44 
(3.2)*** 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
3.48 
(5.76)*** 
 
- 
 
 
 
0.81 
 
34 
 
12.73 
(0.77) 
 
81.24 
(3.2)*** 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
3.95 
(4.84)*** 
 
 
0.77 
 
34 
 
                                                          
5 The term public information here seems to be awkward since we focus on price movements before the news become 
public (i.e. released). This term follows Barclay and Warner, 1993.  
As discussed in the methodology section, all 
observations are weighted by absolute 
cumulative returns during the event periods. 
Regression (1) shows positive and significant 
sign for type of investors. This result confirms 
the results from informal analysis: domestic 
investors account for larger price movements 
during the event periods. This result also 
supports the hypothesis of private information 
by domestic investors.  
It will be interesting to contrast the two 
competing hypotheses above (public vs private 
information) by including the proportion of 
trading volume or number of transactions with 
cumulative returns. The combination of both 
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variables serves also for robustness tests for 
earlier result. If, by including the proportion of 
trading volume, we still obtain a positive and 
significant coefficient for investor type, then 
our conclusion that domestic investors move 
prices more than foreign investors is robust. 
The larger base of domestic investors does not 
seem to drive my earlier result.  
Regression (2) of table 1 shows positive 
and significant coefficient for proportion of 
trading volume, but negative sign for type of 
investors. The result seems to support public 
information hypothesis. Non-public yet 
information seems to spread over the market, 
generating trading which is proportional to the 
cumulative returns. Regression (3) of table 1 
uses the proportion of number of transactions 
in the same context as the proportion of trading 
volume. We obtain a similar result: a positive 
and significant coefficient for proportion of 
number of transaction and negative sign for 
type of investors. 
Unfortunately the correlation between 
investor type and the proportion of trading 
volume is very high (about 0.9 and significant 
at 1% level). This clearly creates an 
econometric problem and helps explain 
inconsistency between signs for investor type 
and proportion of trading volume/number of 
transaction. To circumvent this problem, we 
create an orthogonal relationship between 
investor type and proportion of trading 
volume, by regressing proportion of trading 
volume on investor type. Then we use the 
residual from the regression as a proxy for the 
proportion of trading volume. This process 
creates an instrumental variable that has very 
high correlation with the proportion of trading 
volume, but is not correlated with investor 
type. We interpret the residual as an 
unexpected proportion of trading volume given 
investor types. Regression (4) shows the result 
using a proxy for proportion of trading 
volume. The regression shows positive and 
significant coefficients for both investor types 
and proxy for proportion of trading volume. 
Regression (5) uses proxy for proportion of 
number of transactions. This variable serves 
the same function as provided by proportion of 
trading volume in regression (4). We obtain 
similar result as in regression (4). 
Overall we find that domestic investors 
account for larger price movements during the 
event periods. Our findings do not rule out 
‘public information hypothesis’; both private 
and public information hypotheses seem to be 
supported. 
3. Price Movements among different trade 
sizes 
The second question we want to answer is 
the medium chosen by informed traders. 
Specifically, we investigate on which trade 
size the price movements concentrate. We 
divide trade size into three categories: (1) 
small trade size (up to 5,000 shares, or 10 lots), 
(2) medium trade size (from above 5,000 to 
50,000 shares, or above 10 to 100 lots), and (3) 
large trade size (above 50,000 shares, or more 
than 100 lots).  
Easly and O’Hara (1987) show that given 
information, informed traders choose large 
trade size to maximize their profit. Empirical 
findings by Barclay and Warner (1993) show 
that informed trades concentrate on medium 
trading size. The choice of medium trading 
size by informed traders seems to make sense. 
Informed traders will try to conceal their 
information from other traders or from related 
authorities (to avoid insiders trading charges).  
Descriptive statistics shows that price 
movements concentrate on small and medium 
trading sizes. There is a monotonic inverse 
relationship between cumulative returns and 
trading size. The smallest, medium, and largest 
trading sizes accounts for about 85%, 71%, 
and 32% of cumulative returns, respectively. 
This pattern suggests that informed trades tend 
to choose small trading size. Unfortunately the 
F-tests do not reveal any statistical significance 
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on the differences among different trading 
sizes. 
Table 2 shows the result of regression 
analysis using trade size as an independent 
variable. Regression (1) shows that the sign for 
trade size is as expected, that is a negative 
sign, but statistical power is very weak. 
Regressions (2) and (3) test public information 
hypothesis. The results do not support the 
hypothesis. Since correlation between trading 
size and proportion of trading volume or 
number of transactions is very high (about 0.9 
and significant at 1%), this paper attempts to 
create an instrumental variable using the same 
step as in the previous section. As in the 
previous section, we interpret the variables as 
unexpected proportion of trading volume/ 
number of transactions given the trading size. 
In general, we find weak results in the tables. 
 
Table 2. The effect of trading size, trading volume, and number of transactions on cumulative 
returns during the announcement periods 
 
This table summarizes regression of cumulative returns during the period of news announcement 
on several variables. Trading size of less than 5,001 shares has a value of 1, 5001-50,000 shares 
has a value of 2, and larger than 50,000 shares has a value of 3. The definitions of other variables 
are explained in the text. ***, **, and * mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Intercept 
 
 
Trading Size 
 
 
Proportion of Trading 
 Volume 
 
Proportion of Number of 
 Transaction 
 
 
Adj-R-Sqr 
 
Num of Obs 
 
36.65 
(2.11)** 
 
-1.31 
(-0.16) 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
0.33 
 
51 
 
31.07 
(1.67)* 
 
-2.69 
(-0.32) 
 
0.24 
(0.82) 
 
- 
 
 
 
0.33 
 
51 
 
-39.85 
(-0.84) 
 
20.95 
(1.39) 
 
- 
 
 
0.95 
(1.74)* 
 
 
0.35 
 
51 
 
4.  The Interaction between Investor Types 
and Trading Size 
In this section, we attempt to answer the 
third question. There are several reasons to 
motivate this analysis. First, in an emerging 
market such as Indonesia, institutional players 
seem to be limited. Managed funds are still in 
early stage. We can expect individual investors 
to dominate domestic investors. Individual 
investors tend to trade in small trading size. 
Second, we expect foreign investors tend do be 
institutional investors, since only big players 
are able to conduct cross-border investment. 
Hence we expect that institutional investors 
tend to dominate foreign investors.  
Informal investigation shows that for 
domestic investors, small trades account for 
the largest price movements in the event 
periods. For foreign investors, medium trades 
account for the largest price movement in the 
event periods. To investigate more formally 
this conjecture, we use regression analysis. We 
create an interaction variable by multiplying 
investor types with trade size. We expect the 
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sign for the interaction variable to be negative 
and significant. The negative sign suggests that 
small trades of domestic investors and/or large 
trades of institutional investors account for the 
largest price movements in the event periods. 
Table 3 summarizes the findings. 
Although the signs are generally as 
expected, statistical power seems to be weak. 
Only investor types variable has positive and 
significant coefficients, which is consistent 
with the findings from previous section. 
 
 
Table 3. The effect of type of Investors, trading size, and the interaction between type of investors 
and trading size on cumulative returns during the announcement periods 
 
This table summarizes regression of cumulative returns during the period of news announcement 
on several variables. Type of Investors has a value of 1 for domestic investors and 0 for foreign 
investors. Trading size of less than 5,001 shares has a value of 1, 5001-50,000 shares has a value 
of 2, and larger than 50,000 shares has a value of 3. The interaction variable is created by 
multiplying type of investors with trading size. The definitions of other variables are explained in 
the text. ***, **, and * mean significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Intercept 
 
 
Type of Investors 
 
 
Trading Size 
 
 
Interaction between 
Type of Investors and 
Trading Size 
 
Proxy for Proportion of 
Trading Volume  
 
Proxy fir Proportion of 
Number of Transaction 
 
Adj-R-Sqr 
 
Num of Obs 
 
-57.47 
(-0.44) 
 
78.63 
(4.15)*** 
 
-1.62 
(-0.44) 
 
-15.12 
(-1.60) 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
0.28 
 
92 
 
-105.6 
(-0.81) 
 
95.98 
(4.75)*** 
 
-9.08 
(-1.82)* 
 
-6.59 
(-0.66) 
 
 
-76.04 
(-2.17)** 
 
- 
 
 
0.31 
 
92 
 
-105.49 
(-0.81) 
 
91.88 
(4.76)*** 
 
-6.79 
(-1.61) 
 
-8.55 
(-0.89) 
 
 
- 
 
 
-85.07 
(-2.37)** 
 
0.31 
 
92 
 
 
5. Price Movement during the Non-event 
Period 
To check further the robustness of the 
finding, we compare price movements in the 
event with those in the non-event periods. If 
domestic investors move prices more than do 
foreign investors in the non-event period, the 
finding can be generalized into the non-event 
period. The claim that domestic investors 
possess better information can be made 
stronger if we find that the results from the 
event period are specific to that period. 
Specifically, the claim can be made stronger if 
the type of investor has either insignificant or 
significant negative sign. Non-event period is 
defined from day –120 to day –30 relative to 
the announcement periods. Table 4 sum-
marizes the results for the non-event period. 
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Table 4. The effect of type of investors, trading volume, and number of transactions on cumulative 
returns during the non-event periods 
 
This table summarized regression of cumulative returns during the period of news announcement 
on several variables. Type of investor has a value of 1 for domestic and 0 for foreign investors. 
The definitions of other variables are explained in the text. ***, **, and * mean significant at 1%, 
5%, and 10%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Intercept 
 
 
Type of Investor 
 
 
Proportion of 
  Trading Volume 
 
Proportion of 
  Number of 
  Transaction 
 
Proxy for Proportion  
  of Trading Volume 
 
Proportion of 
  Number of 
  Transaction 
 
Adj-R-Sqr 
 
Num of Obs 
 
50.24 
(2.65)** 
 
0.011 
(0.00) 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
0.25 
 
36 
 
-11.64 
(-0.42) 
 
-193.7 
(-2.70)** 
 
3.17 
(2.87)*** 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
0.38 
 
36 
 
29.28 
(1.03) 
 
-76.37 
(-0.94) 
 
- 
 
 
1.18 
(0.99) 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
0.25 
 
36 
 
90.33 
(4.07)*** 
 
-80.31 
(-2.16)** 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
3.17 
(2.87)*** 
 
- 
 
 
 
0.78 
 
36 
 
61.97 
(2.77)*** 
 
-23.48 
(-0.66) 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
1.18 
(0.99) 
 
 
0.25 
 
36 
 
 
 
Investor type has either insignificant or 
negative coefficients in all specifications 
(including those that adjust for 
multicollinearity problem). The result seems to 
support our conclusion that only in the 
announcement periods domestic investors 
account for larger price movements hence 
strengthen our claim that domestic investors 
possess better information. We discuss more 
detail this issue in the next section. 
6. Discussion 
We establish a fact that domestic investors 
account for larger movement during the 
announcement periods. Why do domestic 
investors account for the larger price 
movements in the event periods? One possible 
interpretation is that the larger movements by 
domestic investors simply reflect the larger 
base of domestic investors. Although it is not 
necessary that more investors generate larger 
positive returns, such argument is plausible. To 
test for such possibility, we conduct two tests: 
(1) Control proportion of trading volume and 
number of transaction for each type of 
investors, and (2) Compare price movements 
in the event and non-event periods. In the first 
test, we still find that domestic investors 
account for the larger price movement, even 
after controlling for the possibility of larger 
base by domestic investors (we use proportion 
of trading volume/number of transaction for 
proxies for the size of investors base). In the 
second test, we find that domestic investors 
account for the larger price movements in the 
event but not in the non-event period. The two 
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tests seem to imply that larger investor base is 
not a reason for the finding of this paper. 
Another possible interpretation is that 
domestic investors possess better information 
than do foreign investors. Investors with 
information are more likely to move prices up 
to the point where marginal cost of information 
is equal to marginal benefit of the information. 
This line of reasoning is consistent with 
Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty 
(2001). One may have skepticism to this line 
of reasoning. First, in the Indonesian market, 
individual investors seem to dominate the 
market. Although we do not have data, 
domestic investors seem to be dominated by 
individual investors. Price movements in such 
market may reflect noise, rather than 
information. To address such skepticism, we 
propose the following arguments. First, it is 
not uncommon to have certain class of 
investors, including individual, to have 
superior information. For example, Muelbroek 
(1992) investigates private information in the 
US market. She finds that in many cases of 
insider trading, individuals are involved. 
Second, we condition price movement on real 
events (that is merger announcements). Thus 
the price movements we investigate are not 
based on false rumors. The two arguments lead 
us to a conclusion that domestic investors may 
have better information as reflected on their 
larger price movements. A compromise to 
skepticism at one extreme and our argument at 
another extreme is that part of domestic price 
movement reflects information while other part 
reflects noise. Thus we have to separate the 
two behaviors (noise and information related). 
We leave this issue for further research.
6
  
Another related argument to the ‘noise 
story’ by domestic investors is that foreign 
investors may focus more on long-term 
investment, such as investment based on 
                                                          
6 We may control some measures of noise trading such 
herding and feedback trading. Thus price movements net 
of noise measures can be interpreted as price movements 
that reflect information. 
fundamentals, while domestic investors focus 
more on short-term trading. For example, 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) show that 
foreign and domestic investors tend to have 
different trading behaviors: foreign investors 
are momentum traders, while domestic 
investors are contrarian traders. This 
explanation is plausible to the extent that the 
profit from short-term trading is too small for 
foreign investors to exploit. Beyond that 
assumption, it is hard to reconcile this 
argument with an efficient and competitive 
market in which investors pursue profit 
objectives. If we follow this argument 
(different behaviors), then the explanation 
must come from behavioral finance. The 
evidence in this paper shows that foreign 
investors also participate in the non-public yet 
information. This evidence tends to weaken the 
argument that foreign investors focus on the 
long-term investment. 
Another related puzzle is why foreign 
investors invest in a market where they have 
information disadvantage. Our observation 
shows that foreign investors participate in the 
non-public-yet information, as evidenced by 
increasing trading activities by foreign 
investors. Thus, although we conclude that 
domestic investors have better information 
advantage –thus there is information 
asymmetry in the JSX market –, but degree of 
information asymmetry may not as serious as 
we thought. Another possible reason of why 
they invest in the JSX relates to international 
diversification potential. International 
diversification may result in lower cost of 
capital. Thus foreign investors may be willing 
to obtain lower return because they also have 
lower systematic risk. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper attempts to investigate the issue 
why domestic investors account for larger 
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price movements during the event periods. We 
document that domestic investors account for 
the larger price movements during the event 
periods. We interpret that the larger proportion 
by domestic investors reflects information 
superiority, hence information asymmetry in 
the Indonesian market. We do not find 
convincing evidence that informed trades focus 
on small trades. We do not find convincing 
evidence that there is an interaction between 
type of investors and trading size: domestic 
investors focus on small trades. Although 
informal analysis and the sign of regression 
coefficients tend to support our prediction that 
informed trades concentrate on small trades 
and domestic investors concentrate on small 
trades, but the prediction is not significant 
statistically. Our findings have various 
theoretical and policy implications. 
REFERENCES 
Bailey, W. and J. Jagtiani, 1994, Foreign 
Ownership Restrictions and Stock Price in 
the Thai Market, Journal of Financial 
Economics 36, 57-87. 
Barclays, Michael and Jerold B Warner, 1993, 
Stealth Trading and Volatility, Which 
Trades Move Prices, Journal of Financial 
Economics 34, 281-305. 
Berkman, Henk and Vankat R. Eleswarapu, 
1998, Short-term traders and liquidity: a test 
using Bombay Stock Exchange data, Journal 
of Financial Economics 47, 339-355. 
Bhattacharya, Utpal, Daouk, Hazem, 
Jorgenson, Brian, and Kehr, Carl-Heinrich, 
2000, When an event is not an event: The 
Curious Case of an Emerging Market, 
Journal of Financial Economics 55, 69-
101.  
Bonser-Neal, Catherine, David Linnan, and 
Robert Neal, 1999, Emerging Market 
Transaction Costs: Evidence from Indonesia, 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 7, 103-127. 
Chakravarty, Sugato, 2001, Stealth-trading: 
Which traders move stock prices?, Journal of 
Financial Economics 61, 289-307. 
Cooper, I.A., and E. Kaplanis, 1994, What 
Explains the Home Bias in Portfolio 
Investment, Review of Financial Studies 7, 
45-60. 
Coval, J.D, and Tobias Moskowitz, 1999, 
Home Bias at Home: Local Equity 
Preference in Domestic Portfolios, Journal 
of Finance 54, 2045-2073. 
Dahlquist, Magnus, and Goran Robertsson, 
2001, Direct Foreign Ownership, Institu-
tional Investors, and Firm Characteristics, 
Journal of Financial Economics 59, 413-
440. 
Domowitz, Ian, Glen, J, and Ananth 
Madhavan, 1997, Market Segmentation and 
Stock Prices: Evidence from An Emerging 
Market, Journal of Finance 52, 1059-1085. 
Easley, David and Maureen O’Hara, 1987, 
Price, Trade, Size and Information in 
Securities Markets, Journal of Financial 
Economics 19, 113-138. 
French, Kenneth and Richard Roll, Stock 
Return Variances, 1986, The Arrival of 
Information and Reaction of Traders, 
Journal of Financial Economics 17, 5-26. 
Grinblatt, Mark and Matti Keloharju, 2000, 
The Investment Behavior and Performance 
of Various Investor Types: A Study of 
Finland’s Unique Data Set, Journal of 
Financial Economics 55, 43-67. 
Grinblatt, Mark and Matti Keloharju, 2000, 
How Distance, Language, and Culture 
Influence Stockholdings and Trades, 
Journal of Finance. 
Hau, Harald, 2001, Location Matters: An 
Examination of Trading Profits, Journal of 
Finance, forthcoming. 
Johnson, Simon, Peter Boone, Alasdair 
Breach, and Eric Friedman, 2000, 
Corporate Governance in the Asian 
 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober 
 
532 
Financial Crisis, Journal of Financial 
Economics 58, 141-186. 
Kang, Jun-Koo and Rene M Stulz, 1997, Why 
Is There a Home Bias? An Analysis of 
Foreign Portfolio Equity Ownership in 
Japan, Journal of Financial Economics 46, 
3-28. 
Lee, Yi-Tsung, Ji-Chai Lin, and Yu-Jane Liu, 
1999, Trading Patterns of Big versus Small 
Players in Emerging Market: An Empirical 
Analysis, Journal of Banking and Finance 
23, 701-725. 
Merton, R.C., 1987, A Simple Model of 
Capital Market Equilibrium with Incom-
plete Information, Journal of Finance 42, 
483-510. 
Meulbroek, Lisa, K, 1992, An Empirical 
Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, Journal 
of Finance 47, 1661-1699. 
Rachmawati, Eka Nuraini and Eduardus 
Tandelilin, 2001, Pengaruh Pengumuman 
Merjer dan Akuisisi Terhadap Return Sama 
Perusahaan Target di Bursa Efek Jakarta, 
Jurnal Riset Akuntansi, Manajemen, dan 
Ekonomi Vol 1, No.2, 153-170. 
Shapiro, Alan, 2002, Foundation of Multina-
tional Financial Management, Wiley, 
Boston. 
Shukla, Ravi, and Gregory van Inwegen, 1995, 
Do locals Perform better than Foreigners? 
An Analysis of UK and US Mutual Fund 
Managers, Journal of Economics and 
Business 46, 241-254. 
Stulz, R.M., 1981, On the Effect of Barriers to 
International Investment, Journal of 
Finance 36, 923-934. 
Stulz, R.M. and W. Wasserfallen, 1995, 
Foreign Equity Investment Restrictions, 
Capital Flight, and Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization: Theory and Evidence, 
Review of Financial Studies 8, 1019-1057. 
 
 
